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DELAY, DENY, WAIT TILL THEY DIE:
BALANCING VETERANS’ RIGHTS AND
NON-ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURES




The refrain “Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die” is more than a slogan for
disabled American veterans. It is a battle cry for soldiers, sailors, and air-
men who have long put aside their armaments but remain entangled in the
unending appeals process of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) dis-
ability benefits system. When Congress created a system for the fair and
equitable distribution of military benefits, it did so with the intent that the
system be non-adversarial. Congress did not want disabled veterans pitted
against the nation that they had sought to defend in litigation over disability
benefits. However, defining the contours of that non-adversarial system has
proven to be more difficult than Congress ever anticipated. The paternalis-
tic and protective features of the system designed to insulate veterans from
the burdens of adversarial litigation have left veterans without legal re-
course to address system failures. Using the VA’s process for developing
expert medical testimony as an example, this article examines the costs and
benefits of the non-adversarial process and argues that adversarial proce-
dures must be woven into the fabric of the veteran-friendly system to en-
sure that veterans’ rights are protected. This article concludes that, without
adversarial processes to compliment the veteran-friendly rules, the VA
model relegates disabled veterans to a substandard process for adjudicating
disability benefits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is experiencing thegreatest crisis it has encountered since its establishment as a fed-eral agency in 1930.1 The VA faces a crippling claims backlog,2
high turnover in executive leadership and frontline positions,3 and morale
1. See About VA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.va
.gov/about_va/vahistory.asp [https://perma.cc/47CQ-4MV2]. The VA is the second largest
department after the Department of Defense. See VA’s Administrations, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.ruralhealth.va.gov/aboutus/structure.asp
[https://perma.cc/KAN3-YL2P]. The VA is composed of three divisions: the Veterans
Health Administration (VHA); the National Cemetery Administration (NCA); and the
Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA). Id. This article focuses on the VBA, the division
that manages veterans’ benefits.
2. See Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS 12 (2017), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/
BVA2017AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2MY-EUWU] [hereinafter Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals,
Annual Report 2017]. The VA appeals inventory stands at over 471,000 appeals. Id. at 21.
In 2017, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals issued decisions in 52,661 cases, though it received
90,327 new cases. Id. at 13. Veterans currently wait an average of three years for a Board
decision. Id.
3. Secretary Robert L. Wilkie, Jr. was sworn in as the tenth United States Secretary
of the VA on July 30, 2018. Senior Executive Biography: Robert Wilkie, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, https://www.va.gov/opa/bios/docs/wilkie.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T4C-
W6PM] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). He is the third Secretary to be appointed to the position
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problems stemming from scandals that are exhausting its more than
377,000 employees.4 This confluence of factors, amidst a polarizing na-
tional debate on the privatization of veterans’ health care, has left the VA
reeling. As one VA physician described the situation, “The V.A. seems
in the last four years. See Donovan Slack & Dennis Wagner, VA Failures Endured Through
Three Secretaries, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2018, 5:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2018/03/29/veterans-affairs-failures-go-beyond-ousted-secoutlive-three-secre
taries-soon-four-including-david-sh/470573002/ [https://perma.cc/PSG7-CMF6]; see also
Mohana Ravindranath, Wilkie Overwhelmingly Confirmed as VA Secretary, POLITICO (July
24, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-ehealth/2018/07/24/wil
kie-overwhelmingly-confirmed-as-va-secretary-295130 [https://perma.cc/L5PJ-3GDG] (dis-
cussing critics’ concerns that Secretary Wilkie will privatize VA health care); Leo Shane
III, 3 Looming Questions for Robert Wilkie’s Confirmation Hearing, MILITARY TIMES
(June 20, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/2018/06/20/three-looming-ques
tions-for-robert-wilkies-va-confirmation-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/559M-N38Q] (discuss-
ing vacancies at all levels of the VA).
4. See Lisa Rein, ‘Failure is Not An Option’: VA Nominee Robert Wilkie Told to Fix
the Agency’s Morale Crisis, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/robert-wilkie-trumps-pick-for-va-secretary-to-face-tough-questions-on-his-past/
2018/06/27/106863f6-798d-11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html?utm_term=.ff44f301e82c
[https://perma.cc/RT9Y-GCJ6]; see also Curt Devine, 307,000 Veterans May Have Died
Awaiting Veterans Affairs Health Care, Report Says, CNN (Sept. 3, 2015, 11:38 AM), https:/
/www.cnn.com/2015/09/02/politics/va-inspector-general-report/index.html [https://perma.cc/
AA3M-G4RG]; Phil McCausland, Veterans Haven’t Received GI Bill Benefits for Months
Due to Ongoing IT Issues at VA, NBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www
.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/veterans-haven-t-receive-gi-bill-benefits-months-due-ongoing-
n934696 [https://perma.cc/SW5Y-UZK9] (attributing the VA’s failure to pay education
benefits to lack of employee retention and consistent leadership); Paul Muschick, Veterans
Died While Waiting For Slow-Moving Benefits Appeals, THE MORNING CALL (Mar. 30,
2018, 8:00 AM), http://www.mcall.com/opinion/muschick/mc-opi-veterans-die-while-wait
ing-for-va-benefits-muschick-20180329-story.html# [https://perma.cc/K4CB-NU8C]; Katie
Zezima, Everything You Need to Know About the VA—and the Scandals Engulfing It,
WASH. POST (May 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/05/21/
a-guide-to-the-va-and-the-scandals-engulfing-it/?utm_term=.9a8f76cab9f9 [https://perma
.cc/ZN4U-PWPE] (discussing the VA’s false record keeping, long wait lists for care, and
“mismanaged” programs and facilities). In 2014, the VHA was involved in a secret wait list
scandal that was discovered at the Phoenix, Arizona VA hospital. Richard A. Oppell, Jr. &
Michael D. Shear, Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid Waiting Lists at Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES
(May 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/va-report-confirms-improper-wait
ing-lists-at-phoenix-center.html [https://perma.cc/LY6N-F3RC]. Similar problems were
later discovered at other VA facilities. Id. At the time, the VA Inspector General (IG)
reported that more than 1,700 veterans on secret waiting lists waited an average of 115
days for primary care appointments. Id. In a later report, the IG found that out of about
800,000 records that were stalled in the VA’s health care enrollment system, more than
307,000 records belonged to veterans who had died months or years earlier. Devine, supra
note 4. The IG later confirmed that about 1,100 veterans actively seeking health care had
died while waiting for their appointments. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., 16-01750-79, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF TIME-
LINESS OF THE APPEALS PROCESS 12 (Mar. 28, 2018) [hereinafter REVIEW OF TIMELINESS
OF APPEALS PROCESS]. The scandal led to the resignation of then VA Secretary Eric Shin-
seki and prompted Congress to pass the “Choice Act.” See Veterans Access, Choice, and
Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1754 (2014) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). The NCA, a division of the VA, has also
experienced problems. See Christian Davenport, Burial Problems Found at VA Cemeteries,
WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/burial-problems-found-
at-va-cemeteries/2012/01/23/gIQAYXLFMQ_story.html?utm_term=.570b4a2d2ae3 [https://
perma.cc/AE3D-QA9W] (following an FBI investigation of the Army-run Arlington Na-
tional Cemetery, the NCA conducted a review of its cemeteries in 2012 and found scores of
misplaced headstones and people buried in the wrong location).
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like a jumbo jet over the Atlantic without a pilot right now . . . [t]here is
chaos in the cockpit, and there is chaos in the cabin, too.”5
Media attention has rightly focused on secret VA hospital waiting lists
and veterans who have died while waiting for medical care.6 But a lesser-
known problem exists within another division of the VA that is affecting
thousands of disabled veterans, many of whom are seriously ill and are
waiting for resolution of their disability benefits claims.7 Within the Vet-
erans Benefits Administration (VBA), disabled veterans are being re-
traumatized by an overburdened and dysfunctional benefits system that
Congress intended to be “veteran-friendly,” but in fact prevents veterans
from obtaining the benefits they earned in service.8
Congress created an informal and flexible benefits system so that veter-
ans would not be embroiled in adversarial litigation against the govern-
ment they fought to defend.9 As such, the VBA distributes benefits
pursuant to statutes and regulations that are uniformly described as “non-
adversarial” by the VA adjudicators and judges who decide veterans’
benefits cases.10 The rules of evidence for VA hearings are relaxed, there
is no statute of limitations on filing claims, and veterans can endlessly
appeal denied claims upon a showing of new and relevant evidence.11
Many veterans and their advocates appreciate the informality of the pro-
cess, until their claims are denied.
The problem with the non-adversarial process is that the VA often ig-
nores or misapplies its regulations. When this happens, veterans have lim-
ited remedies to challenge VA errors. Of course, veterans have the right
to appeal adverse agency decisions, but the average administrative appeal
takes almost five years to reach a resolution.12 Appeals to the specialized
5. Dave Philipps & Nicholas Fandos, V.A. Medical System Staggers as Chaos Engulfs
Its Leadership, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/us/politics/
va-medical-system-chaos.html [https://perma.cc/8MLP-PZ34].
6. See Zezima, supra note 4.
7. See 60 Minutes: Why the VA Frustrates Veterans (CBS television broadcast Jan. 3,
2010), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-the-va-frustrates-veterans/ [https://perma.cc/
46MS-5CRP].
8. See Leo Shane III, Watchdog Report: The VA Benefits Backlog is Higher Than
Officials Say, MILITARY TIMES (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2018/
09/10/watchdog-report-the-va-benefits-backlog-is-higher-than-officials-say/ [https://perma
.cc/E2V5-X78L].
9. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (an often cited passage,
Judge Michel noted that “the character of the veterans’ benefits statutes is strongly and
uniquely pro-claimant”).
10. Id.
11. See Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-55,
131 Stat. 1105 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
12. See Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS 25 (2018), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/
BVA2018AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3TM-QV77] [hereinafter Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals,
Annual Report 2018]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS
ADMIN., APPEALS MODERNIZATION 3 (May 2018), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Appeals_
Modernization_Brief_May2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ75-QW7E] (“For those appeals
that were decided by the Board of Veterans Appeals in FY 2016, on average, Veterans
waited at least 7 years from filing their [notice of appeal] until the Board decision issued
that year.”).
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courts reviewing VA decisions can take up to seven years.13 Homeless,
mentally ill, and terminally ill veterans cannot afford such delays. Ac-
cording to the VA Office of the Inspector General, approximately 1,100
veterans died in 2016 after waiting more than a year for the VA to rule on
their appeals for benefits.14 The maxim “[d]elay, deny, hope they die” has
unfortunately become a reality for many disabled veterans.15
In 2017, the Supreme Court examined the VA’s non-adversarial pro-
cess in a case called Mathis v. Shulkin.16 In his petition for a writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court, Mr. Mathis challenged an evidentiary rule
that presumes all VA medical providers are competent to issue medical
opinions regardless of the case or claimed medical condition.17 The Su-
preme Court denied Mr. Mathis’s petition for a writ of certiorari, though
two Justices issued statements questioning the VA’s process for resolving
veterans’ challenges to the competency of VA medical examiners.18 Jus-
tice Gorsuch noted that the rule lacked a statutory or regulatory basis
and that it contravened the VA’s duty to assist veterans.19 Justice
Sotomayor called the veteran’s situation “a catch-22,” referring to the
process by which a veteran must make a specific objection to an exam-
iner’s competence without the VA providing any information about an
examiner’s credentials as a matter of course.20 She invited the lower
courts and the VA to “continue their dialogue over whether the current
system for adjudicating veterans’ disability claims can be squared with the
VA’s statutory obligations to assist veterans in the development of their
disability claims.”21 This article takes up Justice Sotomayor’s invitation by
analyzing the rights of veterans and steps the VA can take to ensure
timely and accurate receipt of benefits.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the veterans’ benefits sys-
tem, including its veteran-friendly features. This article argues that the
13. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2017),
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2017AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4SRK-AV85] [hereinafter U.S. COURT OF VETERANS CLAIMS ANNUAL REPORT 2017] (the
median time for filing a petition for review by the court to disposition is 1.4 months).
14. REVIEW OF TIMELINESS OF APPEALS PROCESS, supra note 4, at 12.
15. See Muschick, supra note 4.
16. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 F. App’x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom.
Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Brief of Law
School Veterans Clinics and Attorneys as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Mathis, 137 S. Ct. 1994 (No. 16-677), 2016 WL 7451283 [hereinafter
Brief in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari] (clinic students from five law
schools, including the University of Baltimore School of Law, Harvard Law School, the
University of Missouri School of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, and William
and Mary Law School, participated in preparing the brief in support of the petitioner).
17. Mathis, 643 F. App’x at 971.
18. Mathis, 137 S. Ct. at 1994–95 (Sotomayor, J., denying cert.; Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(in a statement accompanying the denial of the petition, Justice Sotomayor explained that
the Court denied the petition because Mr. Mathis never requested his examiner’s creden-
tials; without the request for the examiner’s credentials, and the VA’s response to such a
request, the Court could not fully review the presumption and the VA’s practice).
19. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 1994 (Sotomayor, J., denying cert.).
21. Id. at 1995.
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veteran-friendly regulations are indeed beneficial to veterans, but only
when they are applied correctly. This article focuses on the critically im-
portant process for developing expert medical testimony to describe how
veterans have no recourse in the non-adversarial system when the VA
fails to correctly apply its veteran-friendly procedures. Part II examines
the reasons why the non-adversarial system has failed veterans, despite its
veteran-friendly features. Using the example of expert medical testimony,
Part III compares the veterans’ benefits system to the Social Security dis-
ability and workers’ compensation systems, and argues that the adver-
sarial procedures used in these systems should be incorporated into the
veterans’ benefits system to facilitate adherence to veteran-friendly rules.
This article concludes by examining other proposals to modify the system
and explains why these proposals fall short of providing veterans with the
necessary means to resolve systemic issues.
As it stands, the benefits system subverts veterans’ rights and offers no
timely mechanisms to correct VA errors. Veterans deserve better than
that. The VA must protect the veteran-friendly features of the system by
incorporating adversarial measures that will facilitate the proper applica-
tion of the rules.
II. AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN CRISIS
“As I prepare to leave government, I am struck by a recurring thought: It
should not be this hard to serve your country.”22
Although the VHA is by far the most well-known division of the VA,
the VBA provides benefits to more than 313,441 veterans annually with
an estimated total payment of about $3.78 billion in benefits awards a
year.23 This section discusses the laws that govern the VA benefits system,
including the veteran-friendly canons that Congress codified to assist vet-
eran claimants.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE VETERANS’ BENEFITS SYSTEM
The current disability system has its roots in the British and French
veterans’ benefits systems and, like those systems, primarily serves two
purposes.24 The first is to care for veterans and their widows and or-
22. David J. Shulkin, Op-Ed, David J. Shulkin: Privatizing the V.A. Will Hurt Veterans,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/opinion/shulkin-veterans-
affairs-privatization.html [https://perma.cc/Y46H-D77H] (Shulkin served as VA secretary
under Presidents Obama and Trump, from July 6, 2015, to March 28, 2018).
23. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., ANNUAL
BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2016: COMPENSATION 4 (2016), https://www.benefits.va
.gov/REPORTS/abr/docs/2016_abr.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZNK-K2YV].
24. See JAMES D. RIDGWAY, VETERANS LAW CASES AND THEORY 6 (West Academic
Publishing, 1st ed. 2015); see also About VA, supra note 1. The practice of awarding bene-
fits to injured soldiers dates back to the colonization of North America. The Pilgrims of
Plymouth Colony were at war with the Pequot Indians. Recognizing the unique relation-
ship between disabled soldiers and the communities they protect, the Pilgrims passed a law
mandating that the Colony support the disabled soldiers. Many years later, the Continental
Congress used the promise of disability pensions to encourage enlistments during the Rev-
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phans.25 The second is to maintain the security of the United States and
the readiness of the U.S. military by providing veterans with benefits
earned through service.26 The goals of the system are accomplished
through a patchwork of statutes and regulations that have developed over
the last two centuries.27
Various benefits are available to military veterans, though the focus of
this article is on disability compensation. Compensation may be awarded
to veterans for disabilities resulting from injuries suffered or diseases con-
tracted during military service.28 Veterans must meet specific VA eligibil-
ity requirements and must provide evidence that their injury or disease is
related to military service.29 A prima facie case for direct service-connec-
tion requires (1) medical evidence that the veteran has a current disabil-
ity, (2) medical evidence of an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a
disease or injury, and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the
claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability.30 Veterans
with service-connected injuries or diseases are eligible to receive monthly
disability compensation and medical treatment at VA hospitals.31
The procedure for claiming and appealing benefits has been likened to
a hamster wheel because veterans’ claims are developed, denied, ap-
pealed, and remanded ad infinitum.32 The process begins when a veteran
files a claim for benefits with the VA Regional Office.33 If the claim is
denied, a veteran may file a Notice of Disagreement.34 Upon receipt of
the Notice of Disagreement, the VA will reconsider the denied claim and
issue a Statement of the Case, affirming or reversing the denial decision,
olutionary War. The process for awarding benefits to veterans has undergone dramatic
change since that time, though the rationale for awarding benefits remains the same.
25. See RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 6; see also President Abraham Lincoln, Second
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) (transcript available in the Library of Congress) (the
VA’s motto, “to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow, and his
orphan,” comes directly from Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address). Lawmakers have in-
troduced legislation to make the motto gender inclusive, but the VA has resisted such bills.
See Nikki Wentling, Two House Lawmakers Launch New Effort to Make VA Motto Gen-
der Inclusive, STARS AND STRIPES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.stripes.com/news/two-
house-lawmakers-launch-new-effort-to-make-va-motto-gender-inclusive-1.556957 [https://
perma.cc/NGD8-DL2S].
26. RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 6.
27. See id. at 6–20.
28. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012).
29. See 38 U.S.C. § 5303(A) (2012); see also 38 C.F.R § 3.304 (2018).
30. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (establishing the requirements for direct service-connection).
Service-connection may also be proved through other means depending on the injury or
disease. See id. § 3.303(b)–(d). For example, presumptive conditions do not require a nexus
between the illness and the event. See id. § 3.303(c). Instead, these illnesses rely on statu-
tory presumptions that the injury or disease occurred in service. Id. Other illnesses such as
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Military Sexual Trauma require additional evidence of
a stressor to establish service-connection. See id. § 3.304(f).
31. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1–4.150 (2018); see also 38 C.F.R. § 17.38 (2018).
32. See Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 434 (2006) (Lance, J., dissenting) (find-
ing that repeated remands “perpetuate[ ] the hamster-wheel reputation of veterans law”).
33. See Veterans Benefits Admin., Life Cycle of a VA Appeal, U.S. DEP’T OF VETER-
ANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Life-Cycle-of-a-VA-Appeal-
FY2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELX8-BWMD] [hereinafter Life Cycle of an Appeal].
34. See id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (2018).
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or notify the veteran of some other disposition.35 Veterans may appeal
final decisions by the Regional Office to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
(the Board).36 After exhausting these administrative remedies, veterans
may appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans
Court), a special Article I court that functions as an appellate court but is
situated like a district court beneath the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.37 The bulk of the delay falls within the appellate process,


















According to the VA, the lifecycle of an appeal, from claim filing to a
decision by the Board, takes almost five years.39 A decision from the Vet-
erans Court takes an additional year or more.40 In all, it can take up to
seven years to appeal a claim to the Veterans Court.41 Additional delays
can extend this time period another two years because about 76% of ap-
peals decided by the Veterans Court are returned to the VA for further
disposition or development.42 Although it is difficult to know exactly how
35. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (2018).
36. See id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 8.30(c) (2018).
37. See Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets Into Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights,
and Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1730 (2017).




42. See U.S. COURT OF VETERANS CLAIMS ANNUAL REPORT 2017, supra note 13, at 2.
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many veterans are enmeshed in the appeals process,43 the VA reported
that, in 2016, veterans submitted Notices of Disagreement, the first step
in the administrative appeals process, in about 16.6% of cases.44 While
this statistic may seem low, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reviewed data from fiscal years 2010 to 2015 and found that the
VA denied 43% of veterans’ initial claims during the six-year period, or
about 14 million of 24.7 million initial claims.45 Additionally, the GAO
found that the denial rates for certain illnesses, such as Gulf War Illness,
were about 83%.46 Given the high remand rates of the Board and the
Veterans Court,47 the data suggests that a significant number of claims
that may have been decided in error will never be reviewed.
B. VETERAN-FRIENDLY CANONS AND THE NON-ADVERSARIAL
BENEFITS SYSTEM
The terms “non-adversarial” and “veteran-friendly” are not statutorily
defined terms, though courts have commonly used these terms to de-
scribe the flexible administrative rules that govern the process.48 Courts
often refer to the fact that VA counsel does not oppose veterans and their
representatives in the administrative claims process, and that the VA has
a statutory duty to assist veterans in establishing their claims.49 In this
respect, the system is similar to the Social Security disability system’s
non-adversarial model of adjudicating claims.50 However, the veterans’
system has a few features that make it unique.
The hallmark of the veterans’ benefits system is its liberal burden of
proof standard for establishing benefits.51 Veterans have the burden of
proving that their disability is “at least as likely as not” related to military
service.52 The VA describes the standard as equal to or greater than 50%,
43. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., ANNUAL
BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2017: COMPENSATION 25 (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www
.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/docs/FY17-Compensation.pdf [https://perma.cc/K68R-
SWBJ] (VA reports “information on the number of service-connected disabilities, as op-
posed to the number of Veterans with those [disabilities].”).
44. See Life Cycle of an Appeal, supra note 33.
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-511, GULF WAR ILLNESS: IM-
PROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR VA TO BETTER UNDERSTAND, PROCESS, AND COMMUNICATE
DECISIONS ON CLAIMS 18 (June 2017).
46. Id.
47. See Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals, Annual Report 2018, supra note 12, at 31. In 2018,
the Board granted 36% and remanded 39% of the claims on appeal. Id. The Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims remanded about 76% of the claims. See U.S. COURT OF VET-
ERANS CLAIMS ANNUAL REPORT 2017, supra note 13, at 2.
48. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Brown v. Gard-
ner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994).
49. See 38 C.F.R § 3.159 (2018); see also 38 C.F.R. § 21.1032 (2018).
50. See Frank S. Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Adversary Hearings: The
Need for Non-Adversary Representatives at Social Security Disability Hearings, 59 WASH.
U. L.Q. 349, 355 (1981); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 254 (Aspen
Publishers, 1st ed. 1976) (supporting inquisitorial procedures for the Social Security disa-
bility system such as those used in the French inquisitorial system).
51. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2018).
52. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1991).
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a more favorable standard than Social Security disability or workers’
compensation cases.53 If the VA finds that the evidence is in equipoise,
the VA applies the “benefit of the doubt” doctrine and must resolve the
claim in favor of the veteran.54
The VA’s statutory duty to assist veterans in the development of claims
is a powerful tool that veterans often use as leverage against the VA.55
Although veterans carry the burden of proving their claims, the VA must
assist veterans in obtaining military and medical records,56 and must pro-
vide veterans with medical examinations to determine the outcome of
their claims.57 The VA’s duty to assist is a necessary feature of the system
because indigent veterans who lack the resources to develop their own
claims often lack access to private healthcare. Violations of the duty to
assist are common, such as when the VA fails to provide veterans with an
adequate examination, and are often the basis for remands from the
Board and Veterans Court.58
Another unique feature of the benefits system is the absence of any
statutory deadlines for filing claims or reopening previously closed
claims.59 Veterans may file new claims at any point during their lifetime.60
After the VA closes a claim, a veteran may reopen a claim by submitting
new and relevant evidence at any time.61 Even without new evidence, a
veteran may allege clear error in a closed case resulting in a review of the
case.62 The doctrine of res judicata exists, but is limited because veterans
are permitted to submit new evidence at almost any stage of the claims
process.63 As veterans age and develop new illnesses, they can submit
new claims and evidence arguing that their illnesses are related to service.
Despite the liberal rules for adjudicating veterans’ benefits, veterans
have long been frustrated by the failures of Congress and the VA to ad-
dress veterans’ grievances.64 In 1932, shortly after the VA was created,
World War I “Bonus Army” veterans marched on Washington to protest
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1 ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MAN-




after M21-1 MANUAL, § A].
54. See Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 53.
55. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2012).
56. See id. § 5103A(c).
57. See id. § 5103A(d).
58. See Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124, 131–32, 135 (2014); see also Comer v.
Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Moore v. Shinseki, 555 F.3d 1369, 1372–74
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
59. See Rory E. Riley, The Importance of Preserving the Pro-Claimant Policy Underly-
ing the Veterans’ Benefits Scheme: A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Structure
of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits System, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 77,
85–88 (2010).
60. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012).
61. See 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012).
62. See id. § 5103A(f).
63. See Norris v. West, 11 Vet. App. 219, 224 (1998).
64. See RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 19.
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delays in the award of veterans’ readjustment bonuses that Congress had
approved to compensate veterans for their absence from the workforce
during the War.65 A violent clash between veterans and mobilized U.S.
Army regiments became a symbol for the disenfranchisement of Depres-
sion-era veterans.66 Tension between veterans and the VA peaked after
the Vietnam War, when the VA refused to recognize Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Agent Orange related illnesses caused by
the War.67 It was not until 1980, when the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion recognized PTSD as an illness, that veterans were able to obtain re-
lief through the VA.68
In 1988, under extraordinary pressure from Veterans’ Service Organi-
zations (VSOs) and their veteran constituents to provide relief from the
VA’s arbitrary and capricious decision-making, Congress took its first
steps toward using adversarial procedures to bring accountability to the
process when it passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, which made
the distribution of military benefits subject to review by specialized
65. See id.
66. See id. Prior to the reorganization of the benefits system under the New Deal,
Congress was heavily involved in the distribution of veterans’ benefits. Certain constituents
who stood to gain from the system attempted to influence members of Congress. The pro-
cess was viewed as politically charged and even corrupt. In 1924, Congress passed a bill
granting bonuses to World War I veterans who were facing readjustment issues including
decreased wages due to extended absences from the workforce. When payment of the bo-
nuses was delayed, thousands of veterans demonstrated in Washington, D.C., in an event
known as the Bonus Army. President Hoover ordered the Army Chief of Staff, Douglas
MacArthur, and his two aides, Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton, to evict the veter-
ans from Washington. The political backlash from the confrontation with impoverished
veterans cost President Hoover the 1932 presidential election. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt quickly reorganized the VA system under powers granted to him by the Econ-
omy Act of 1933, a piece of New Deal legislation that gave him the power to create a new
system through executive orders. Ironically, President Roosevelt signed forty-one execu-
tive orders to slash veterans’ benefits and create a $400 million surplus to pay for his New
Deal infrastructure projects. However, fearing further backlash from veterans’ groups,
Congress reversed many of Roosevelt’s cuts.
67. See id. at 26. Severe lung illnesses and cancers related to burn pit exposures are
plaguing Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. The VA refuses to recognize the link, as it did for
PTSD and Agent Orange. See Leo Shane III, As Burn Pit Problems Linger, Advocates
Worry VA and DoD Are Moving Too Slow, MILITARY TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www
.militarytimes.com/veterans/2018/06/07/as-burn-pit-problems-linger-advocates-worry-va-
and-dod-are-moving-too-slow/ [https://perma.cc/8F6D-JAEC]; Quil Lawrence, Veterans
Claiming Illness From Burn Pits Lose Court Fight, NPR (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.npr
.org/2019/01/16/685657005/veterans-claiming-illness-from-burn-pits-lose-court-fight [https://
perma.cc/RR7N-2UDV] (the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the Fourth
Circuit, leaving intact a decision that KBR cannot be held liable for illness related to burn
pits. KBR used burn pits to perform a contract with the military to dispose of trash); see
also In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 893 F.3d 241, 264 (4th Cir. 2018).
68. See RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 27. The VA continues to deny claims related to
Agent Orange exposure, though it has conceded that some cancers are related to military
service in Vietnam. See Richard Sisk, VA Renews Opposition to Agent Orange Benefits for
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courts.69 The new law struck at the core of the non-adversarial system.
Not surprisingly, the VA vehemently opposed judicial oversight and, as
one scholar put it, the VA was brought “kicking and screaming” into the
realm of due process.70 While judicial review brought transparency and
accountability to a system that had operated for almost two hundred
years in “splendid isolation,” it was no panacea.71 The VA was now le-
gally obligated to follow its own rules. But in many cases, its rules fell
short of protecting veterans’ interests.72
C. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF THE NON-ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM:
A CASE STUDY
This section uses the case of Mathis v. Shulkin to describe how the
veteran-friendly features of the veterans’ benefits system are rendered
ineffectual in the absence of meaningful processes by which veterans can
challenge their application.73 The veteran-friendly feature at issue in this
case is the VA’s duty to provide medical exams for the purpose of estab-
lishing veterans’ claims. The case demonstrates the limited means by
which veterans can challenge duty to assist errors, as well as the judici-
ary’s unwillingness to interfere with Congress’s scheme for adjudicating
VA benefits.
At issue in Mathis was whether the VA should benefit from a presump-
tion that all medical examiners are qualified to render expert opinions in
any type of disability benefits case.74 Freddie Mathis served in the U.S.
69. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). Not all veterans favored
judicial review. Many veterans feared that judicial review would lead to the elimination of
veteran-friendly doctrines. VSOs, such as the American Legion and Vietnam Veterans of
America (VVA), disagreed on the reform effort, though VVA ultimately convinced Con-
gress to pass a bill that tied judicial review to a popular proposal to make VA a cabinet
department. See RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 32.
70. See Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judi-
cial Review Act: The VA is Brought Kicking and Screaming into the World of Meaningful
Due Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 43 (1994).
71. See Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in Processing Claims for Veter-
ans’ Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 905 (1975).
72. The VA has a host of system-wide problems that judicial review has not resolved,
including: unreasonable delays in claims processing; mishandling of mail; failing to make
timely notification of medical appointments and claims decisions to veterans; and failing to
obtain records, such as records involving National Guard and Reserve personnel, mental
health, private provider, special operations, and lost and missing records. See Veterans for
Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2012) (exemplifying veterans
unsuccessful challenges to unreasonable delays in the appellate process); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 14-04816-72, VETERANS BENE-
FITS ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH VETERANS BENEFITS MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEM AND CLAIMS PROCESSING 1–4 (Jan. 6, 2016); Leo Shane III, Lawsuit
Demands VA Turn Over Missing Medical Records, MILITARY TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/2015/04/20/lawsuit-demands-va-turn-over-missing-
medical-records/ [https://perma.cc/64J6-ECRA].
73. See Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1995 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), cert.
denied; see also Brief in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23.
74. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 F. App’x 968, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub
nom. Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994 (2017).
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Air Force from August 1980 to August 2002.75 He was healthy for most of
his military career, until the late 1990’s when he routinely experienced
fatigue, shortness of breath, and swelling in his left hand.76 Seven years
after his discharge from service, Mr. Mathis was diagnosed with sar-
coidosis, an inflammatory disease commonly affecting the lungs and
lymph glands.77 Believing that his disease had been caused by “environ-
mental exposures” while serving in the Air Force, Mr. Mathis filed a
claim with the VA for disability benefits.78 A VA medical examiner spe-
cializing in family practice medicine reviewed Mr. Mathis’s VA claims file
and rendered a negative opinion, stating that Mr. Mathis’s in-service pul-
monary symptoms were not related to his sarcoidosis.79 The VA subse-
quently denied the claim.80
The VA enjoys an evidentiary presumption that it has properly chosen
a medical examiner who is qualified through education, training, or expe-
rience to offer medical diagnosis, statements, or opinions in any disability
benefits case.81 The common law rule, known as the “presumption of
competency,” has no provenance in statute or regulation.82 Although the
presumption is rebuttable, the VA provides no mechanism for veterans to
obtain the credentials of VA examiners prior to a hearing in order to
formulate a rebuttal.83
Mr. Mathis filed an appeal challenging the competency of the VA ex-
aminer.84 He argued that the presumption of regularity, on which the pre-
sumption of competency rests, should only apply to routine, ministerial
procedures.85 He also challenged its application in the VA’s non-adver-
sarial process and argued that the presumption shifts the burden of proof
to an “unsophisticated party” who lacks access to the evidence necessary
to rebut the presumption.86
The Federal Circuit found merit in Mr. Mathis’s arguments but de-
clined to overrule the Veterans Court or its own precedent. The court
noted that, in the line of cases applying the presumption of regularity to
75. Id. at 969.
76. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Mathis, 643 F. App’x 968 (No. 2015-7094),
2015 WL 5086429, at *4.
77. Id.; see also Michael C. Iannuzzi et al., Medical Progress: Sarcoidosis, 357 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 2153, 2153–65 (Nov. 22, 2007) (explaining that sarcoidosis is a disease that presents
as tiny granules or nodules, called granulomas, that may form in one or more organs of the
body, and can change the structure and functioning of the organs).
78. See Mathis, 643 F. App’x at 969.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 970.
81. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Bastien v.
Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sickels v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1362, 1365–66
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
82. See Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1995 (2007) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
83. See id.
84. See Mathis, 643 F. App’x at 970.
85. See id. at 972.
86. See id. at 972–73. The majority of veterans are represented by VSO representatives
who are not attorneys. See Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals, Annual Report 2018, supra note 12, at
31.
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the VA’s selection of medical examiners, there exists no discussion about
whether the VA’s procedures for selecting examiners are “regular, relia-
ble, and consistent.”87 It also noted that the VA’s guidelines broadly rec-
ommend generalists but the record was silent as to the process by which
examiners are selected.88 However, the court stated that it could not
overrule its previous decisions upholding the presumption because it
lacked jurisdiction to make factual findings regarding the competency of
the examiner in question.89 The court called for the VA to consider an
administrative rule that would create a clear standard for determining the
sufficiency of an examiner’s qualifications.90
The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari, though two
Justices issued opinions accompanying the Court’s decision not to hear
the case. Justice Sotomayor recognized the veteran’s predicament in the
case, calling the veteran’s situation a “catch-22.”91 However, because Mr.
Mathis had failed to raise the competency issue at the Board and had not
requested the credentials of his examiner,92 she was not willing to decide
whether the presumption of competency or the VA’s failure to provide
examiners’ credentials under the duty to assist violated due process.93
Waiting until such a case is presented, she wrote, would provide the Fed-
eral Circuit and the VA with an opportunity to “continue their dia-
logue.”94 Dissenting from the Court’s decision, Justice Gorsuch warned
that the significance of the issue to many veterans warranted the Court’s
immediate attention.95
Mathis is a prime example of how the non-adversarial process under-
cuts the veteran-friendly canons. Under the duty to assist, the VA must
provide medical exams to claimants but veterans cannot meaningfully
challenge expert testimony during the process. The VA maintains that it
cannot permit interrogatories or cross-examinations of experts because
Congress intended for the system to be non-adversarial.96 Veterans must
therefore exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing litigation in
the courts, often to correct simple errors. This highly ineffectual process
has contributed to the current backlog of administrative appeals and has
87. See Mathis, 643 F. App’x at 974. The court noted that the presumption of regular-
ity was applied to the VA’s mailing of notices to veterans and other ministerial, routine,
and nondiscretionary tasks. Id. at 973. Nowhere in the line of cases applying the presump-
tion to the competency of medical examiners did any court perform an analysis to verify
the selection and assignment of VA examiners. Id. at 974.
88. See id. at 974.
89. See id. at 975.
90. See id.
91. Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1994 (2007).
92. See id. The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), a VSO that helps veterans file
claims, represented Mr. Mathis at the Board but did not raise the competency issue. Mr.
Mathis did not have legal counsel until his case reached the Veterans Court, at which time
he challenged the presumption.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See Mathis, 137 S. Ct. at 1995 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
96. See Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124, 131 (2014).
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manufactured an expert testimony crisis for the VA.97
D. THE EXPERT TESTIMONY CRISIS
The impact of the Mathis case on veterans’ benefits is significant. Al-
most every benefits case relies on expert medical testimony to establish a
nexus between a veteran’s current injury and his or her military service.98
The VA is permitted to consider a wide-variety of evidence when review-
ing claims, but the nexus of an illness (i.e., whether it is “as likely as not”
that an illness or injury was caused in service) is a determination that is
reserved for medical examiners.99 Unfortunately, the Mathis case pre-
serves the non-adversarial processes that contribute to the production of
errant medical exams. A more detailed description of the medical exam
process is necessary to understand how non-adversarial processes con-
tributed to the crisis and to explore possible alternatives to the current
procedures.
The VA provides veterans with “compensation and pension,” or
“C&P” exams, pursuant to their duty to assist veterans develop benefits
claims.100 A cadre of VA employees and contractors perform the exams.
Examiners may be credentialed doctors, nurse practitioners, or physician
assistants.101 Any provider employed by the VA is deemed qualified to
conduct an exam and render an opinion on any claim, regardless of the
nature of the claim or the provider’s area of expertise.102
The purpose of the exam is to ensure “that the evaluation of the
claimed disability will be a fully informed one.”103 VA adjudicators are
“neither medical professionals nor attorneys,” therefore medical opinions
must contain a sufficient explanation of the medical findings so that a
layperson can weigh and evaluate the evidence.104 In a typical day, a con-
tractor will perform about seven or eight exams, rendering opinions on
97. The VA reports that there are currently 367,708 claims pending. See Veterans Ben-
efits Administration Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, https://www.benefits.va
.gov/reports/detailed_claims_data.asp?src=org_fb_dj [https://perma.cc/7UP4-FCKP] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2019).
98. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2018). For a history of early VA medical examinations,
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age,
119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1428–39 (2010).
99. M21-1 MANUAL, § A, supra note 53; see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d
1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 307–08 (2007); Colvin v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991).
100. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) (2012).
101. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1) (2018).
102. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 F. App’x 968, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub
nom. Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994 (2017).
103. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991) (holding that an adequate exami-
nation must include a review of the veteran’s claims history).
104. See James D. Ridgway, Lessons the Veterans Benefits System Must Learn On Gath-
ering Expert Witness Testimony, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 408 (2009) (discussing qualification
of Regional Office adjudicators).
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multiple claims per exam.105 Examiners use Disability Benefits Question-
naires (DBQ) to answer routine questions about veterans’ claimed disa-
bilities, such as if a veteran has a current diagnosis, or if the condition
impacts a veteran’s ability to work.106
The process has significant flaws and often yields poor results. First, the
VA relies exclusively on opinions from C&P examiners, rather than VA
primary care providers, for establishing service-connection.107 Within the
VA system, C&P examiners and medical providers serve discreet roles.
Although the VA considers medical evidence from VA primary care
providers, the VA does not elicit their opinions.108 Providers, who are
often familiar with the patient’s full medical history and are likely to have
in-depth information that would assist adjudicators, have almost no role
in the process. Presumably, the VA has chosen to shield VA providers
from compensation issues to protect the physician-patient relationship.
However, other disability benefits systems have relied on treating physi-
cians’ opinions without upsetting this relationship.109
The VA’s preference for C&P examiners’ opinions contributes to its
failure to obtain evidence from veterans’ private physicians.110 The pre-
105. See Dennis Velez, M.D., Comp. and Pension Exam’r, Contractor for the Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, Address at the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium Confer-
ence: C & P Exams (Feb. 28, 2018).
106. See Disability Benefits Questionnaires (DBQs), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AF-
FAIRS, https://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/dbq_disabilityexams.asp [https://perma
.cc/8GRF-SPEJ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). Both VA and private medical examiners use
DBQs. The forms were intended to standardize the opinions for VA and private exams and
to ensure that providers include all the relevant information needed for an adequate medi-
cal opinion.
107. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 419–20.
108. See id. at 421. Examiners do not review the entire claims file. Rather, a predeter-
mination team tabs relevant medical information in the veteran’s file. There is no record of
which documents in the claims file were tabbed, therefore it is impossible to know whether
a medical examiner was directed to all relevant evidence in any case.
109. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2018); see also Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evalu-
ation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c); Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, SOC. SE-
CURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/revisions-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4WW-XAAW] (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). The Federal Circuit rejected
the argument that the opinions of a veteran’s personal physicians should be accorded spe-
cial deference. See White v. Principi, 243 F.3d 1378, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Until re-
cently, Social Security Administration (SSA) adjudicators gave “controlling weight” to
treating physicians’ opinions under the “treating source rule.” The SSA eliminated the
treating source rule so that its adjudicators would not be required to give substantial
weight to a treating physician’s opinion regardless of the supportability and consistency of
the opinion. According to the SSA, it eliminated the treating source rule to avoid the Ninth
Circuit’s application of the “credit-as-true” rule, a rule that the SSA said abdicated the
decision-making authority of the SSA adjudicator and “sometimes result[ed] in the court
ordering us to award benefits instead of remanding the case for further proceedings.” Revi-
sions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, supra. Although the SSA
abolished the treating source rule, it does consider a medical provider’s relationship with
the claimant, including the length of the relationship and the frequency of examinations, as
well as the specialization of the medical provider, as important factors in the consideration
of the medical opinion. See also Clare J. Horan, The Importance of Special Medical Consul-
tants in the SSA Disability Determination Process: Analysis and Proposals, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1361, 1374 (2017).
110. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 419.
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vailing view among VSOs is that the VA does not give equal weight to
opinions by private physicians and C&P examiners.111 In one study,
about 50% of VA adjudicators reported having difficulty rating cases
based upon private medical opinions. Only about 25% of the adjudicators
reported having difficultly rating cases based on C&P examiners’ opin-
ions.112 VSOs reported that the exact opposite was true.113 Regardless of
whether the VA gives equal weight to private medical opinions, the ap-
pearance of a hierarchy of evidence gives veterans the impression that
treating physicians’ opinions are ignored or given less weight than VA
opinions.
Second, the opinions that C&P examiners produce are often inade-
quate. An adequate opinion must be based on the medical examiner’s
knowledge and skill in analyzing the relevant data, in addition to the ex-
aminer’s reasoned conclusions.114 In many instances, medical examiners
are simply not able to review and identify the pertinent records in the
patient’s lengthy medical history upon which to provide an informed
medical opinion.115 Furthermore, examiners often do not understand or
are not aware of the reasons why the Board has remanded a case for
another medical opinion. For example, the Board described the problem
in a recent case this way:
In 2003, the Board remanded this case for a VA examination, re-
questing that the examiner identify any respiratory disorder, includ-
ing a sinus disorder, state whether any such disability is related to
active service, and provide a thorough rationale for any opinion ex-
pressed. Since the Board’s 2003 remand, the Veteran has been af-
forded numerous VA examinations, as noted in the Joint Motion
granted by the Court in January 2015. However, none have fully
complied with the Board’s 2003 remand directives.116
Unfortunately, the VA has not implemented a process to help examiners
write opinions that meet the medical and legal requirements for an
exam.117 Most examiners now use the VA’s check-the-box DBQs, though
examiners must still explain their conclusions in narrative form. In one
survey, 56% of Regional Office adjudicators reported that inadequate ex-
111. See id. at 417.
112. See id.
113. See DANIEL HARRIS, THE CNA CORP., FINDINGS FROM RATERS AND VSO’S
SURVEYS 14 (May 2007), http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/files/Commission_Reports/
CNA_May_2007_Survey_Results.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X4Q-VNSN].
114. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 300 (2008); see also Buchanan v.
Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303,
310–12 (2007); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007); Stegall v. West, 11 Vet.
App. 268, 270–71 (1998).
115. See Nieves-Rodriguez, 22 Vet. App. 295 at 305.
116. No. 1526657, 2015 WL 4690765, at *1 (Bd. Vet. App. June 23, 2015). Students in
the Bob Parsons Veterans Advocacy Clinic at the University of Baltimore School of Law
represented the veteran in this case. In 2017, the Veterans Court granted another joint
motion for remand due to an inadequate examination. See No. 1704071, 2017 WL 1299706,
at *7 (Bd. Vet. App. Feb. 9, 2017).
117. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 409–11.
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ams made it difficult to review claims.118 In 2013, the Board’s chief execu-
tive told Congress, “[t]he adequacy of medical examinations and
opinions, such as those with incomplete findings or supporting rationale
for an opinion, has remained one of the most frequent reasons for re-
mand.”119 Given the complexities of the exams, and the lack of communi-
cation between medical examiners and the Board, it is no surprise that
the leading cause of Board remands is inadequate medical exams.120
The lack of communication between the adjudicators and medical
providers is one of the most complex problems that the VA faces.121 It is
extremely difficult for adjudicators to communicate complicated medical
and legal questions to providers by relaying messages through Board de-
cisions. The process is like a “game of telephone.”122 When a case is re-
manded from the Veterans Court, the Board issues orders directing the
VA to take action to resolve issues in a case. The orders might ask the VA
to obtain a medical opinion regarding whether a veteran’s disability is as
likely as not related to service or whether a veteran’s disability was as
likely as not aggravated by military service.123 Board orders are often
complicated and may lack the necessary background that is necessary for
a medical examiner to provide an adequate opinion. For example, the
Board might provide a list of instructions to the Regional Office, such as
the following: (1) conduct an exam to determine if specific disorders are
present, and specifically address a previous VA treatment record docu-
menting sinusitis; (2) provide an opinion as to whether the veteran’s sinu-
sitis and any other current disorders were incurred or aggravated by
military service; and (3) if you find that the sinusitis or any other current
disorders were incurred or aggravated by service, provide an opinion as
to whether these service-connected disorders may have caused any other
disorders. It is impossible to expect that such instructions will be properly
understood and executed without further communication between the
parties. Without an opportunity for clarification, there is a substantial risk
that someone will misunderstand the remand orders, and the underlying
justifications for them, and that the resultant opinion will be inadequate.
Congress created a streamlined system for adjudicating veterans’ bene-
fits, but the system is in turmoil. Favorable rules that indeed assist veter-
ans and their families in obtaining the benefits they earned in service
118. Id. at 417.
119. Why Are Veterans Waiting Years on Appeal?: A Review of the Post-Decision Pro-
cess for Appealed Veterans’ Disability Benefits Claims: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs of the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 113th Cong. 22
(2013) (statement of Laura H. Eskenazi, Executive-in-Charge of the Board of Veterans’
Appeals).
120. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 416.
121. See id. at 421–23.
122. See James D. Ridgway, A Benefits System for the Information Age, 7 VETERANS L.
REV. 36, 53 (2015).
123. See, e.g., No. 1552016, 2015 WL 10004845, at *12 (Bd. Vet. App. Dec. 11, 2015);
No. 1543733, 2015 WL 7875614, at *2 (Bd. Vet. App. Oct. 13, 2015); No. 1538484, 2015 WL
6939522, at *1–2 (Bd. Vet. App. Sept. 9, 2015); No. 1501503, 2015 WL 1194124, at *7–8
(Bd. Vet. App. Jan. 13, 2015).
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have been rendered ineffectual. Non-adversarial procedures that were
meant to facilitate the award of benefits have instead delayed or thwarted
equitable outcomes for veterans. The expert testimony crisis is a prime
example of the non-adversarial process gone awry. Although Congress
adopted judicial review of veterans’ benefits cases, the courts are limited
in what they can do. The next section explores the limitations of judicial
review and examines why the courts have declined to interfere with the
non-adversarial system despite the need for reform.
III. WHY JUDICIAL REVIEW HAS FAILED TO PROTECT
VETERANS’ INTERESTS
Congress’s unique design for the veterans’ benefits system has in many
ways isolated it from other administrative law systems. The courts review-
ing VA benefits decisions are distinct from general federal courts and
have specific, limited statutory authority to review benefits decisions.124
These courts afford great deference to Congress’s statutory scheme and
are generally unwilling to impose formal or objective rules on the sys-
tem.125 This section examines the courts’ relatively limited role in the ad-
judication of veterans’ benefits and the deference that courts afford to
Congress’s statutory scheme that keeps the non-adversarial system intact.
A. THE LIMITED ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS
Congress designed a unique system for judicial review of veterans’ ben-
efits decisions. As discussed above, initial claims are filed and adjudicated
in VA Regional Offices, and adverse decisions can be appealed to the
Board.126 Once a claimant has exhausted his or her administrative reme-
dies at the Board, he or she may appeal to the Veterans Court. The Veter-
ans Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions by the VA
Secretary.127 A claimant may appeal decisions by the Veterans Court to
the Federal Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court.128 The exclusive ju-
risdiction of these courts insulates the VA from intervention by general
federal courts that might upset the non-adversarial nature of the system.
To understand how these reviewing courts limit veterans’ abilities to
raise procedural challenges, it is necessary to discuss the distinct authority
of these courts. The Veterans Court has the power to affirm, modify, or
reverse a decision of the Board, or to remand a matter for further eviden-
tiary development.129 The Veterans Court has no fact-finding authority
and reviews the VA’s fact determinations under the clearly erroneous
124. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7292 (2012).
125. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319–20 (1985).
126. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012).
127. See id. § 7252(a); see also Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013,
1020 (9th Cir. 2012). General federal courts may hear cases involving constitutional issues
that do not involve review of decisions by the VA Secretary.
128. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1).
129. See id. § 7252(a).
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standard.130 The Federal Circuit may only review questions of law and is
prohibited from reviewing challenges to factual determinations or chal-
lenges to law or regulations as applied to the facts of a particular case.131
Veterans may bring suit in general federal court, but these courts only
have jurisdiction to review facial statutory or constitutional challenges
that do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Veterans Court or
the Federal Circuit.132 That is, they may not decide any issue that would
require review of decisions affecting the provision of benefits to individ-
ual claimants.133 This framework has been extremely successful in limit-
ing judicial review to bite-sized issues that do not upset the non-
adversarial nature of the benefits scheme.
While the Veterans Court has the authority to decide a broad range of
issues affecting the administration of veterans’ benefits, it has exercised
its authority narrowly.134 For example, the Veterans Court has the power
to modify or reverse Board decisions, but it has used that power spar-
ingly. The court disposes most of its cases through remands back to the
Board, rarely reversing Board decisions.135 The Veterans Court will gen-
erally remand cases with faulty or “inadequate” medical opinions back to
the Board, citing its statutory prohibition on de novo review of the facts
as the reason for not reversing a Board decision and granting benefits.136
Likewise, the Veterans Court has been criticized for issuing too many
“memorandum decisions,” or single-judge opinions that have no prece-
dential authority.137 Scholars have urged the court to consider whether
more cases should be referred to three-judge panels for precedential deci-
sions.138 And, until recently, the Veterans Court maintained that it had
no power to hear class action lawsuits, meaning veterans were left to chal-
130. See id. §§ 7261(a)(4), 7261(c), 7292(d)(2). The Veterans Court is specifically pro-
hibited from conducting de novo review of benefits decisions by the VA Secretary.
131. See id. § 7292.
132. See id. §§ 511(b)(4), 7252(a), 7292(c); see also Veterans for Common Sense, 678
F.3d at 1033–34 (discussing a split in the circuit courts regarding whether 38 U.S.C. § 511
prohibits veterans from bringing facial constitutional challenges to acts of Congress in fed-
eral district court).
133. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1034.
134. See Michael P. Allen, Commentary on Three Cases from the Federal Circuit and the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims As We Approach Twenty-Five Years of Judicial Re-
view of Veterans’ Benefits, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 136, 151 (2013).
135. See id. at 150.
136. See id. at 152.
137. See id. at 157–58.
138. See id. at 158. The Veterans Court considers six factors when deciding whether to
refer a case to a three-judge panel to issue a precedential opinion, including if the case on
appeal is of
relative simplicity and (1) does not establish a new rule of law; (2) does not
alter, modify, criticize, or clarify an existing rule of law; (3) does not apply an
established rule of law to a novel fact situation; (4) does not constitute the
only recent, binding precedent on a particular point of law within the power
of the Court to decide; (5) does not involve a legal issue of continuing public
interest; and (6) the outcome is not reasonably debatable.
Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25 (1990).
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lenge unfair procedures on a case-by-case basis.139
Claimants who are disillusioned with the Veterans Court’s limited
power to resolve broader issues have brought suit in general federal
courts, though they have mostly been unsuccessful.140 Federal courts have
denied challenges alleging that lengthy delays in providing benefits to
claimants violate due process, including delays in providing health care to
claimants with PTSD and other mental health disorders.141 In fact, very
few veterans’ cases can be heard in general federal court because of statu-
tory bars limiting the review of benefits decisions to the Veterans Court
and Federal Circuit.142 The limited number of cases that general federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear are decided in favor of the government,
often because the courts are unwilling to interfere with Congress’s statu-
tory scheme.
B. DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS AND LIMITED DUE PROCESS
FOR DISABLED VETERANS
Judicial review of agency action is a limited form of review.143 As the
Supreme Court emphatically stated in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Associ-
ation, “Beyond the APA’s minimum requirements, courts lack authority
‘to impose upon [an] agency its own notion of which procedures are
“best” or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good.’”144
Notably, Congress did not extend APA procedures to the veterans’ bene-
fits system for fear that doing so would upset its non-adversarial under-
139. But see Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1318–21 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding Veter-
ans Court has the authority to hear class action lawsuits under the All Writs Act, other
statutory authority, and the Veterans Court’s inherent powers).
140. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1015–16 (9th Cir.
2012) (the court did not have jurisdiction to review claimant’s plea to remedy delays in the
system because the issue was related to benefits decisions that are only reviewable by the
Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit); see also Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir.
1995) (the court did not have jurisdiction to review a veteran’s state tort claim against a VA
doctor because the court was precluded from reviewing the case under 38 U.S.C. § 511);
Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1159–60 (5th Cir. 1995) (the court lacked jurisdiction to
review a veteran’s challenge to a denial of benefits on constitutional grounds); Chinnock v.
Turnage, 995 F.2d 889, 892 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 38 U.S.C. § 511 precluded
judicial review of the VA’s interpretation of a regulation that affected the denial of a vet-
eran’s disability benefits). But see Hanlin v. United States, 214 F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review an attorney’s fee claim that is unre-
lated to the veteran’s benefits decisions).
141. See Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1016; see also Viet. Veterans of Am. v.
Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 656, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (veterans’ advocacy groups lacked stand-
ing to bring an action against the VA seeking declaration that the average time it took the
VA to process veterans’ claims for service-related disability benefits violated the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause); Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 972
(6th Cir. 1997) (veterans have an alternate adequate remedy in Veterans Court, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to benefits decisions by the VA).
142. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 511, 7252(a), 7292 (2012).
143. See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890,
1930–31 (2016); see also Mashaw, supra note 98, at 1465.
144. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015) (quoting Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)).
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pinnings.145 As such, due process challenges in the VA system are
analyzed using the well-known test announced by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge.146 The factors that must be weighed in determining
whether a deprivation violates an individual’s due process rights are: (1)
the private interest affected by the government action; (2) the risk of er-
roneous deprivation, including the value of additional procedural safe-
guards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens of any additional procedural safeguards.147 Fur-
ther, as Justice Powell announced in Mathews, “In assessing what process
is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith
judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration
of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure
fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.”148
This section examines due process challenges in the veterans’ benefits
system. It explores the utility of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test in
analyzing due process challenges in the VA system and concludes that it
is the wrong test for determining procedural rights for veterans.
In 1985, in the heat of the due process revolution, the Supreme Court
heard a blockbuster case that involved the right of veterans to retain
counsel in pursuing disability benefits claims. 149 The issue in Walters v.
National Association of Radiation Survivors was whether 38 U.S.C.
§ 3404(c) violated due process by imposing a $10 fee limitation on attor-
neys who represent veterans in benefits cases.150 The fee limitation effec-
tively eliminated attorneys from representing claimants, a restraint on
liberty and speech that appellees argued violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and their First Amendment rights. 151 The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the statute
was unconstitutional and entered a preliminary injunction barring the VA
from imposing the fee limitation.152
The district court looked to Mathews for guidance in analyzing the due
process question. The issue in Mathews was whether the termination of a
recipient’s Social Security disability benefits payments prior to an eviden-
tiary hearing violated due process.153 Mathews was factually similar to a
case the Court had decided seven years earlier, Goldberg v. Kelly, in
145. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); see also Explanatory Statement of
the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, 134 Cong. Rec. 31,477 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5843.
146. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976).
147. See id. at 335.
148. Id. at 349.
149. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307 (1985).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 308.
152. See id. Prior to 1988, judicial review of VA decisions was precluded by 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a). However, in Johnson v. Robison, the Supreme Court held that district courts
have jurisdiction to hear cases involving constitutional challenges to the VA claims system.
See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 (1974).
153. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323.
2019] Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die 299
which the Court held that a recipient of welfare benefits was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of his benefits.154 Distinguish-
ing Goldberg, the Mathews Court noted that the private interest at stake
in disability cases was somewhat less than in need-based benefits cases.
The Court also noted the reduced risk of error in disability cases because
of the reliability of unbiased medical reports used to decide such cases.155
Therefore, the Court held that a predetermination hearing was not re-
quired in Mathews.156
Despite the benefits distinctions discussed in Mathews, the district
court in Walters held that the fee limitation violated veterans’ due process
rights.157 The court engaged in an exhaustive balancing of the Mathews
factors, noting that veterans’ interests in receiving benefits was significant
and that many recipients are totally disabled and are not able to obtain
gainful employment.158 The court also noted that, without counsel, veter-
ans incurred a significant risk of forfeiting their rights due to the complex
technical medical and legal issues involved in the cases.159 The court
therefore concluded that the fee limitation violated the Due Process
Clause.160
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the district court “went seri-
ously awry in assessing the constitutionality of § 3404.”161 According to
the Court, the crux of the issue was the proper weight to afford the gov-
ernment’s interest.162 After rebuking the district court for “cavalierly dis-
missing” the preservation of the 123 year-old fee limitation rule, the
Court considered the consequences of disrupting Congress’s informal,
non-adversarial ex parte system of adjudicating benefits.163 Cataloging
the government’s interests, the Court stated that, if claimants were repre-
sented by counsel, the VA would require more government lawyers; the
role of the hearing officer would become akin to that of a trial judge; and
lawyers, advancing clients’ claims by any ethical means, would prolong
the already lengthy decision-making process.164 In short, the Court af-
forded substantial deference to Congress’s interests in maintaining an in-
154. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–71 (1970).
155. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343–45.
156. See id. at 349.
157. See Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1323 (N.D.
Cal. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
158. See id. at 1314.
159. See id. at 1319–20.
160. See id. at 1327.
161. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985).
162. See id. at 321–22.
163. See id. at 323.
164. See id. at 324–25. Analyzing the risk of error, the Supreme Court applied the gen-
erality standard articulated in Mathews. Id. at 330. As Justice Powell explained, the fairness
of procedures turns on the risk of error as applied in the generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions. Id. at 321. In Walters, the Supreme Court estimated that “complex” cases ac-
counted for less than two percent of the Board’s caseload and less than one-half percent of
Regional Office cases. Id. at 329. The Court concluded that complex cases were the rare
exception, not the norm, and therefore the fee limitation satisfied the Mathews test. Id. at
330.
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formal and flexible system and refused to question the wisdom of denying
counsel to disabled veterans.165
Twenty-four years after Walters, the Federal Circuit decided a case that
signaled a potential shift in how courts might review claimants’ due pro-
cess challenges.166 In Cushman v. Shinseki, the court considered whether
an applicant’s due process rights were violated when the VA considered
improperly altered medical records to deny his claim.167 The facts were
straightforward: Mr. Cushman was awarded partial disability benefits for
a back condition but was denied other benefits.168 Years later, Mr.
Cushman discovered that the official medical records that the VA had
relied upon to deny his claims had been improperly altered.169 The VA
conceded that the documents had been fraudulently altered but contin-
ued to deny his claims.170 On appeal, the Board found that the altered
documents constituted harmless error, and the Veterans Court affirmed
the Board’s decision.171 The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court’s
decision, finding that improperly altered material evidence constituted a
clear due process violation.172 More importantly, the court held that vet-
erans’ benefits are “nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated benefits,” and
that applicants for benefits have an entitlement to veterans’ benefits that
“is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”173
Scholars called Cushman a watershed decision because never before
had the court recognized an applicant’s property interest in disability
165. See id. at 326. Three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Walters, Congress
passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, an act that abolished the $10 fee limitation rule.
See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). However, under the Act, lawyers were pro-
hibited from charging a fee until after the VA had issued an adverse decision and the
claimant had filed a Notice of Disagreement. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2012). As of Feb-
ruary 19, 2018, pursuant to the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of
2017, veterans may hire an attorney after an initial decision on a claim. See Veterans Ap-
peals Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105 (2017)
(codified as amended in scattered section of 38 U.S.C.).
166. See Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1292–93. Philip Cushman served in the Marine Corps combat infantry
battalion and was injured while fortifying a bunker in Vietnam. He suffered from a spinal
injury when a heavy sack fell on his spine. It took the VA three years to review his initial
claim and to develop evidence before granting service-connection for his back injury. For
the next twenty years, Mr. Cushman filed claims and appeals related to his back injury.
169. See id. at 1293–94. Mr. Cushman discovered discrepancies in his medical records
when he found there were two versions of the documents. The altered documents con-
tained additional statements that understated his disability. The Portland VA Regional Of-
fice conceded the error and destroyed the altered documents. A fraud investigation was
opened but closed shortly thereafter.
170. See id. at 1294.
171. See id. at 1294–95. The Board denied Mr. Cushman’s claim on grounds that there
was no evidence to establish that the Board specifically relied on the altered documents to
deny Mr. Cushman’s claim.
172. Id. at 1300. The Federal Circuit held that the presentation of improperly altered
material evidence constituted a due process violation in analogous cases in other circuit
courts.
173. See id. at 1298.
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benefits or applied constitutional due process protections to that inter-
est.174 Prior to Cushman, due process principles were exclusively a crea-
ture of statute, codified in laws and regulations adopted by Congress and
the VA to ensure the “fair adjudication” of veterans’ benefits.175 Judicial
review of due process challenges was chiefly a question of whether the
VA had followed its own procedures and regulations.176 After Cushman,
due process issues were clearly a matter of constitutional interpretation.
The distinction was significant because the Federal Circuit has broader
statutory authority to review factual determinations in cases that present
constitutional issues.177 The Cushman decision, therefore, broadened the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to include review of run-of-the-mill factual
determinations in cases that Congress did not intend for Federal Circuit
review.178 In other words, the Federal Circuit could review the factual
determinations necessary to determine what process is due under Ma-
thews v. Eldridge and potentially sustain due process challenges for
veterans.179
Despite the hype, the Cushman decision did not impact judicial review
in the way that scholars predicted. In the last decade, there have been few
due process cases that have expanded rights for veterans or resolved sys-
temic problems in the benefits system.180 There are two reasons for this.
First, the due process analysis still requires judges to keep a thumb on the
scale for the government’s interests. Second, judges continue to apply the
Mathews test as a zero-sum calculation in which the increase in procedu-
ral rights for veterans results in a decrease in the informality and flexibil-
ity of the system. Judges are not willing to accept the notion that
174. See Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitu-
tion Can Tell Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 526–28
(2011).
175. Id. at 502 n.14; see also 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (2018).
176. See Michael P. Allen, The Law of Veterans’ Benefits 2008-2010: Significant Devel-
opments, Trends, and a Glimpse into the Future, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 1, 44 (2011); see also
Austin v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 547, 552 (1994); Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 119, 125
(1993); Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 103, 107 (1990).
177. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2); see also Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1310–11
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
178. See Allen, supra note 174, at 520–21.
179. See id. at 521.
180. See id. at 515–18; see also Mathis v. McDonald, 643 F. App’x 968, 975 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (denying a challenge to the presumption of competency, a common law rule that the
Board applies to presume that all VA medical examiners are competent to perform medi-
cal exams, unless rebutted by the veteran); Sprinkle v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1180, 1182 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (holding that a veteran was not denied fair process by not providing him with a
copy of a medical examiner’s opinion until fewer than thirty days before the Board’s deci-
sion); Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Rader, J., concurring)
(rejecting the court’s holding in Cushman that applicants for benefits have a property in-
terest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, stating “I perceive
that this court has run before the Supreme Court sounded the starting gun on property
rights for applicants.”); Justice v. McDonald, No. 14-2502, 2015 Vet. App. LEXIS 1541, at
*10–11 (Nov. 13, 2015) (denying a challenge alleging that a veteran’s due process rights
were violated when the VA failed to provide the veteran with a copy of his medical exam
and adverse decision).
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procedural rights for veterans are actually compatible with the veteran-
friendly system.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Gambill v. Shinseki illustrates the
zero-sum problem.181 In Gambill v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit consid-
ered whether the VA’s prohibition against interrogatories violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.182 Mr. Gambill alleged that
he had a constitutional right to submit interrogatories to the ophthalmol-
ogist on whose opinion the VA relied to deny Mr. Gambill’s claim. The
court decided the case on other grounds, but two of the judges wrote
concurring opinions addressing the constitutional question.183 Judge
Bryson wrote that due process does not require that claimants be given
the right to confront medical examiners.184 Relying heavily on the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Walters, he emphasized that due process is a
flexible concept, and that the process required depends on the impor-
tance attached to the interests in the case.185 He noted that veterans’ in-
terests in disability benefits are not granted on the basis of need, and
therefore should be weighted less than claimants’ interests in welfare pay-
ments.186 Judge Bryson then outlined the various non-adversarial proce-
dures of the benefits system and, citing the Walters decision, stressed that
“great weight must be accorded to the Government interest at stake
here.”187
Judge Moore rejected the zero-sum calculation endorsed by Judge
Bryson and instead compared the veterans’ disability system to the Social
Security disability system.188 She refused to accept that Congress in-
tended to give disabled veterans fewer rights than disabled citizens who
had not borne the battle. 189 She questioned Judge Bryson’s reasoning
that interrogatories make the veterans’ benefits system more adversarial
“because by the time a veteran has the need to question a doctor, that
doctor has already provided an opinion adverse to the veteran’s
interests.”190
181. See Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
182. See id. at 1310. Mr. Gambill asserted that he has a constitutional right to submit
interrogatories to the medical examiner.
183. See id. at 1312–13. The Federal Circuit avoided the constitutional question by
holding that even if Mr. Gambill had been denied a due process right to submit interroga-
tories, he suffered no harm because no medical evidence was presented that could establish
a nexus between Mr. Gambill’s cataracts and his head injury. Id. The Veterans Court
avoided the constitutional question because Cushman had not yet been decided when the
case was first appealed. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision on “fair pro-
cess” grounds. Id. at 1310.
184. See id. at 1313 (Bryson, J., concurring).
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1314 (distinguishing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), on
grounds that disabled veterans do not rely on disability payments for daily subsistence as
welfare recipients do and therefore have a reduced property interest that permits less for-
mal procedures).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 1326 (Moore, J., concurring).
189. See id.
190. Id.
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Judge Moore’s concurring opinion is significant because it rejects the
dichotomy that the veterans’ benefit system is either adversarial or non-
adversarial. Judge Moore noted that Congress blurred these lines when,
after Walters, Congress implemented judicial review of benefits cases and
gave veterans the right to hire an attorney.191 As scholars have noted, the
post-Walters benefits system is a combination of formal and informal
rules that could be construed as both adversarial and non-adversarial.192
If judges dispensed with the adversarial-non-adversarial construct, they
could more appropriately consider the need for additional procedural
safeguards to address the risk of error in the system. In other words, the
Mathews test could be an effective test for determining when judicial-type
procedures must be imposed on the VA, but only if judges avoid the ei-
ther-or construct and recognize the need to balance the system with more
procedural safeguards for veterans.193
C. THE VA’S DUTY TO ASSIST FAILURES
“In the veterans’ uniquely claimant friendly system of awarding com-
pensation, breaches of the duty to assist are at the heart of due process
analysis. If the Constitution provides no protection against the occur-
rence of such breaches, then the paternalistic interest in protecting the
veteran is an illusory and meaningless assurance.”194
As discussed above, while veterans have a right to the fair adjudication
of their claims under the Fifth Amendment of the Due Process Clause,
courts have been reluctant to interfere with Congress’s statutory scheme.
As such, the fair and equitable distribution of benefits is dependent on
the protections provided by the VA’s regulatory process. In lieu of adver-
sarial mechanisms, such as discovery and depositions, to aid claimants in
the development of evidence, veterans are dependent on the VA to pro-
vide them with documents under a doctrine known as the “duty to as-
sist.”195 Generally, the VA has a duty to assist veterans in the preparation
of their claims.196 Appellate courts have avoided constitutional questions
about veterans’ rights to discovery and depositions by instead reviewing
whether the VA failed to assist veterans in the development of their
191. See id. at 1328.
192. See Allen, supra note 174, at 531; see also Michael P. Allen, The United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission
to Consider Its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 378–79 (2009); Ridgway, supra note 104,
at 423.
193. But see Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters the Mission Is Clear, the
Execution Is Muddled: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Decision to Deny Veterans the
Due Process Right to Hire Attorneys in the VA Benefits Process, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 671,
736 (2016) (reexamining Walters’s assumption that the VA system is non-adversarial and
calling for a reevaluation of veterans’ rights to counsel under the Mathews factors).
194. Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
195. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2012).
196. See id. § 5103A(a). The scope of the VA’s duty to assist veterans is ambiguous and
perennially litigated by claimants challenging the VA’s failure to act in various stages of the
adjudicative process.
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claims in individual cases.197 This piecemeal approach to judicial review is
laborious and slow and has done little to resolve structural problems
within the VA.
Two cases are illustrative. As noted earlier, the Mathis case dealt with
the presumption of competency that the Board affords VA medical exam-
iners in disability benefits cases.198 Judge Hughes found no issue with the
limited presumption because, under the duty to assist, “a veteran may
always request information to challenge an examiner’s competency from
the regional office or the Board.”199 The opinion is noteworthy because it
misconstrues how the duty to assist actually works. The VA may be or-
dered to produce an examiner’s credentials if a veteran raises a specific
objection to the examiner’s competency.200 However, absent a court or-
der, the VA is not inclined to produce any information about its examin-
ers. The VA adjudicator’s manual, the M21-1, specifically addresses
requests for examiners’ credentials.201 The manual states, “[t]he mere fact
that such a communication is received does not mean that the examina-
tion is insufficient or in need of clarification, or that there is a further duty
to assist to obtain records or another examination.”202 The manual further
states that adjudicators are to read the substance of such communications
and to check that the examiners’ opinions comply with VA regulations,
but that they should not respond to interrogatories.203 Hence, veterans
have no means to obtain evidence with which to rebut the presumption of
competency. Judge Hughes’s opinion also ignores the VA’s lengthy
processing times and the years of litigation involved in resolving a compe-
tency challenge. Disabled veterans are suffering from serious illnesses
197. See, e.g., Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124, 134 (2014) (the court did not ad-
dress whether the Board violated the veteran’s Fifth Amendment due process rights when
it refused to allow the veteran to question the VA medical examiner, instead framing the
issue as a duty to assist error).
198. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 F. App’x 968, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
199. Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Hughes, J., concurring)
(denying petition for rehearing en banc).
200. See Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
201. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1 ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MAN-
UAL, pt. III, subpt. IV, ch. 3, § D (2019), available at https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/
system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/en-US/portal/5544000000010
18/content/554400000015812/M21-1-Part-III-Subpart-iv-Chapter-3-Section-D-Examina
tion-Reports?query=Nohr#2 [https://perma.cc/AM4G-UFYZ] [hereinafter M21-1 MAN-
UAL, § D].
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. See id. This is an unreasonable demand on VA adjudicators. The law governing the
competency of medical examiners and the adequacy of medical opinions is a complex area.
For example, the M21-1 manual instructs adjudicators to read Nohr v. McDonald and Bas-
tien v. Shinseki. See id. In Bastien, the Federal Circuit held that, because the VA is not
required to affirmatively establish the competency of its examiners, veterans must raise
specific objections to an examiner’s qualifications to rebut the presumption of competency.
Bastien, 599 F.3d at 1307. VA adjudicators are, therefore, expected to decide whether cor-
respondence from the claimant’s attorney, which could be in the form of interrogatories,
raises legitimate concerns with respect to an examiner’s qualifications. VA Adjudicators
should not be expected to resolve such issues without significant legal training. Nonethe-
less, the M21-1 directs adjudicators to read case law to resolve these issues.
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and often cannot wait for a decision by the Veterans Court.204 Finally, the
opinion ignores the fact that the credentials of examiners are an impor-
tant factor in determining the weight of the opinions. VA adjudicators
routinely consider providers’ credentials when determining the probative
weight of private opinions.205 An equitable weighing of evidence cannot
be made without knowing the credentials of VA examiners.
The Nohr case provides another example of courts using the duty to
assist to avoid constitutional questions. Mr. Nohr filed a claim for a dys-
thymic disorder based on a statement from his private physician that his
depression may have originated during service.206 Between February
2003 and July 2012, the VA requested four medical opinions that the
Board subsequently determined to be inadequate because they did not
provide the substantive information to determine service-connection.207
In each case, the claim was remanded for another medical opinion.208 For
example, in a July 2011 opinion, the examiner described the symptoms of
dysthymic disorder, and then stated that “Mr. Nohr ‘ha[d] not endorsed
any traumatic event other than his ordinary military duty’ and opined
that ‘there is obvious and manifest evidence that [Mr. Nohr’s] preexisting
dysthymic disorder was not aggravated by service.’”209 On appeal to the
Veterans Court, the parties agreed that the opinion was conclusory and
not supported by an adequate rationale, and jointly remanded the case
for another opinion.210
In the fourth and final medical opinion, the examiner, Dr. Feng, pro-
vided an addendum to her opinion that stated, “Respectfully, while I rec-
ognize my personal limitation, the Board should seek for the next expert
opinion if this examiner’s report still is not satisfied by the Board re-
view.”211 Mr. Nohr submitted interrogatories to the Board asking the ex-
aminer to explain her statement regarding her “personal limitation.”212 In
204. See Life Cycle of an Appeal, supra note 33. It can take more than seven years to
obtain a decision from the Veterans Court.
205. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 424.
206. See Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124, 126 (2014). A dysthymic disorder is a
mood disorder characterized by extended episodes of depression.
207. See id. at 126–27.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 127 (alterations in original) (quoting Record of Proceedings at 112, Nohr, 27
Vet. App. 124 (No. 13-1321)).
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 127–28. Mr. Nohr requested that the examiner answer eleven questions:
(1) State your full name. (2) State your place of employment and the address.
(3) Provide a copy of your most recent and up[-]to[-]date curriculum vitae.
(4) Provide a copy of the Board . . . request letter to you that you refer to in
the first line of your medical opinion dated July 30, 2012[,] for James A.
Nohr, (here[in]after “the veteran”. (5) Provide copies of all written corre-
spondence between you and the Board regarding the [v]eteran including, but
not limited to e-mails, letters, faxes, and the like. (6) Provide a copy of the
transcript from the July 30, 2012[,] interview between you and the [v]eteran.
(7) Provide a copy of all handwritten notes made by you during your inter-
view with the [v]eteran from July 30, 2012. (8) Explain the phrase “personal
limitation” referred to in the last paragraph from your July 30, 2012[,] opin-
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April 2013, the Board issued a decision denying the claim and refusing to
answer Mr. Nohr’s interrogatories, stating that “there is no VA regulatory
authority for interrogatories, and it is stressed that the benefits system is
non-adversarial in nature.”213
On appeal, the Veterans Court vacated the Board’s decision and re-
manded the case for further development.214 Judge Schoelen noted the
Board’s “knee-jerk reaction” to the discovery tool used by lawyers and
commented that the Board’s preoccupation with non-adversarial proce-
dures “prevented the Board from seeing the forest for the trees.”215 She
noted that Mr. Nohr’s interrogatories raised legitimate questions about
the VA examiner’s competency, the adequacy of her opinion, and the
VA’s duty to assist Mr. Nohr in obtaining documents to challenge the VA
examiner’s competency.216 She further cautioned the veterans bar and
the VA to proceed carefully “so as not to unravel Congress’s desire to
preserve and maintain the unique character and structure of the paternal-
istic, nonadversarial veterans’ benefits system.”217 However, she did not
address the constitutional question of whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment entitled Mr. Nohr to confront the examiner.218
The Nohr case demonstrates the court’s unwillingness to upset the non-
adversarial process. But more importantly, it showcases the “hamster
wheel” effect that is created by the VA’s procedures for developing medi-
cal evidence.219 Four inadequate exams over a ten-year period is astound-
ing, though hardly unexpected, given the substantial risk of
miscommunication between VA adjudicators and medical examiners.
Judicial review has brought transparency and accountability to the VA,
but it has not resolved the delays and adjudication errors that have be-
come commonplace. Reviewing courts have limited jurisdiction to inter-
vene in the non-adversarial process, and deference to Congress’s
statutory scheme has undoubtedly helped preserve the status quo. Of
course, Congress has the power to make sweeping changes to the process
but reaching agreement on such issues with the VA and VSOs is a formi-
dable undertaking. The VA could use its rule-making authority to create
ion of the veteran. (9) Explain your etiology for use of the terms “obvious
and manifest” when referring to clear and unmistakable evidence referred to
in the second paragraph of your July 30, 2012[,] opinion of the veteran. (10)
Please elaborate on what a “‘typical dysthymic disorder picture” is, as you
refer to it in the second paragraph of your July 30, 2012[,] opinion of the
[v]eteran. (11) Please elaborate further on what you consider to be “ordinary
military duty” as you so state in the second paragraph of your July 30, 2012[,]
opinion of the [v]eteran.
Id. (alterations in original).
213. Id. at 128.
214. See id. at 135.
215. Id. at 131.
216. See id. at 132–33.
217. Id. at 131.
218. See id. at 134.
219. See Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 434 (2006) (Lance, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that repeated remands perpetuate the “hamster-wheel” reputation of veterans law).
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more balanced procedures that would preserve the non-adversarial sys-
tem but add procedural safeguards to protect the interests of veterans.
The next section explores the structure and features of other claims adju-
dications systems and examines how the VA might implement procedural
safeguards used in those systems.
IV. BALANCING THE NON-ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM WITH
ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURES
The distribution of veterans’ benefits has grown ever more complicated
over the last several decades. Since the implementation of judicial review
in 1988, Congress has marched steadily toward a more legalistic and tech-
nical administrative system for adjudicating benefits.220 Today, the bene-
fits system is governed by a complex web of legal and medical principles
that require veterans and VA adjudicators to have an intimate knowledge
of the substance and mechanics of the rules to adjudicate claims.
While Congress and the VA have introduced more formal rules, the
VA has not implemented a strategy to help its adjudicators keep up with
the law. In 1994, Lawrence Hagel wrote an article about the VA’s slug-
gish reaction to decisions by the courts.221 For fiscal years 1977 to 1989,
Hagel noted that the Board overturned decisions of the Regional Offices
29.5% of the time due to improper adjudication.222 By 1992, the reversal
rate had grown to 66.2%.223 Today, the Board’s reversal rate is about
74%.224 It is no surprise that the Board reverses so many Regional Office
decisions when adjudicators in those offices lack the medical and legal
expertise to properly adjudicate the claims. The VA’s resources are too
few, and its mission too expansive, for the VA to provide the necessary
training and additional personnel to improve claims processing. This sec-
tion compares the veterans’ benefits system with other disability systems
and examines how procedural rights for veterans could provide a check
on high-risk processes, facilitate the timely corrections of errors, and re-
duce the number of claims on appeal.
220. See Allen, supra note 174, at 530–31. For example, Congress abolished the limita-
tion on attorneys’ fees, a change that resulted in more lawyers providing legal services to
veterans in the claims process. See 38 C.F.R § 14.636(c) (2018). Lawyers may collect a
reasonable fee for services provided after the veteran receives an initial decision in the
case. With the passage of the Veterans’ Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Congress imposed a
host of legal requirements on the VA that increased the VA’s notice and duty to assist
obligations to veterans. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat.
2096 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
221. See Hagel & Horan, supra note 70, at 51. Judge Hagel is a retired Chief Judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.
222. Id. at 52. For the period from 1977–1989, Hagel calculated the Board’s reversal
rate by combining the total of the average percentage of cases remanded (17.5%) and the
average percentage of cases actually granting a benefit (13.25%). See id. at 52 n.43.
223. Id. For the year 1992, Hagel calculated the Board’s reversal rate by combining the
total percentage of cases remanded in 1992 (50.5%) and the percentage of cases actually
granting a benefit (15.7%).
224. See Bd. of Veterans’ Appeals, Annual Report 2018, supra note 12, at 31. The au-
thor calculated the Board’s reversal rate by combining the total percentage of cases re-
manded (38.8%) and the average percentage of cases actually granting a benefit (35.8%).
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A. RIGHTS OF CLAIMANTS IN OTHER DISABILITY BENEFITS SYSTEMS
The accurate and reliable production of expert testimony is a critical
feature of the American civil legal system. Tort suits, to which VA claims
are sometimes compared, often require experts to resolve medical is-
sues.225 Rules of procedure permit opposing counsel to cross-examine ex-
pert witnesses on the basis of their knowledge, skill, expertise, training,
and education to render opinions.226 The process is an important feature
of the American court system given the weight that adjudicators afford
such evidence.
Likewise, administrators providing for the mass adjudication of bene-
fits in other systems find it possible, indeed preferable, to incorporate
trial-like rights into their processes. The Social Security disability system
and many state workers’ compensation systems provide claimants with
procedural rights that are akin to trial rights. These rights have been im-
plemented in critical phases of the claims process, such as the develop-
ment of expert testimony, to ensure the proper and efficient resolution of
claims. While these two systems are not perfect, their processes for devel-
oping expert testimony provide a model for a more balanced non-adver-
sarial VA claims system.227
The Social Security disability system processes even more claims than
the VA, making it a good model for comparison. The Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA) manages several programs that provide disability ben-
efits to individuals, including the Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) program and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro-
gram.228 In 2015, SSA decided about 2.5 million SSDI claims, of which 1.6
million required medical opinions.229 That same year, the VA decided
about 1.28 million claims230 and processed at least one million requests
for medical examinations.231 Despite its higher volume claims, the SSA
provides more procedural protections for its claimants than the VA pro-
vides for veterans.
225. See RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 169.
226. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702; see also MD. R. EVID. 5-702.
227. See Erica M. Woehl, Social Security Administration Disability Discrepancies: The
Debate Between Street-Level Bureaucrats and Administrative Law Judges, 91 N.D. L. REV.
353, 354–55 (2015); see also Jon. C. Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quar-
ter-Century and Bureaucratically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the
Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 964–71
(2010).
228. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (2016).
229. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INS. PROGRAM 153 (2016).
230. Life Cycle of an Appeal, supra note 33.
231. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 09-02135-107,
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: AUDIT OF VA’S EFFORTS TO PROVIDE TIMELY
COMPENSATION AND PENSION MEDICAL EXAMS 7–8 (Mar. 17, 2010). The 2010 report
found that the VA had not established procedures to capture the examination workload.
At the time, the VA tracked exam requests rather than actual exams completed. Currently,
neither exam requests nor the actual number of examinations is reported in the VA’s an-
nual report to Congress. See ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2016, supra note
23.
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Social Security claims procedures mirror VA procedures in many
ways.232 Initial claims for benefits are processed at Regional Offices man-
aged by each state.233 If a claim is denied, claimants may request recon-
sideration or elect to have their case decided by an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).234 An ALJ is an SSA employee who presides at administra-
tive hearings on behalf of the SSA Commissioner. Like VA hearings, SSA
hearings are non-adversarial, meaning there is no lawyer for the SSA op-
posing the claim. The ALJ “administer[s] oaths, examin[es] witnesses,
receiv[es] evidence, mak[es] findings of fact, and decid[es] whether an
individual is or is not disabled.”235
The most notable difference between SSA and VA hearings is the ap-
plicability of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to SSA hear-
ings.236 The APA’s hearing provisions provide a statutory basis for
claimants to present oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal
evidence, and “to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosures of the facts.”237 In SSA hearings, medical ex-
perts provide ALJ’s with impartial expert opinions, testifying by tele-
phone, video teleconference, or through the use of interrogatories.238
Although the hearing is non-adversarial, experts testify much as they
would in court. ALJs question experts about their impartiality and their
qualifications for providing an expert opinion.239 Claimants also have the
opportunity to challenge an expert’s competence and may cross-examine
an expert regarding their opinion.240
Veterans have far fewer procedural rights in the VA system. In an ef-
fort to preserve the non-adversarial nature of the system, Congress did
not adopt § 7 of the APA, the section governing hearing adjudications,
when it passed the Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988.241 As a result,
232. See SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., MEDICAL EXPERT HANDBOOK 1 (Aug. 2017), https://
www.ssa.gov/appeals/public_experts/Medical_Experts_(ME)_Handbook-508.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9BD5-6WSM] [hereinafter MEDICAL EXPERT HANDBOOK].
233. See id. at 2.
234. See id. at 3.
235. See id.
236. See Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1323 (Judge Bryson compared § 7(c) of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012), to the Explanatory Statement of the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act of 1988, 134 Cong. Rec. 31,477 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782,
5843, noting that “Congress made clear at the time of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of
1988 that it did not want the provisions of section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act
to apply to veterans’ disability compensation proceedings.”).
237. Administrative Procedures Act § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2018).
238. See MEDICAL EXPERT HANDBOOK, supra note 232, at 5–6.
239. See id. at 5. Experts submit their curriculum vitae for the record as a matter of
course.
240. See id. at 6.
241. See generally Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat.
4105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). The Veterans’ Judicial Re-
view Act (VJRA) is silent as to whether veterans have a right to cross-examination. Legis-
lative history of the VJRA includes the following comment: “The Committees intend that
those informal procedures be continued and that the title 5 procedures relating to adjudi-
cations continue to be inapplicable.” See Explanatory Statement of the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act of 1988, 134 Cong. Rec. 31,477 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782,
5843. However, the context of that passage refers to VA travel board procedures, not hear-
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veterans do not have the right to cross-examine medical experts,242 nor
do they have the right to compel interrogatories.243 As such, veterans are
not able to directly challenge the credibility of expert witnesses during
hearings through an examination of their qualifications, experience, or
training.244
Workers’ compensation systems also rely on informal rules of proce-
dure to resolve claims, though the involvement of employers’ insurance
companies and their lawyers clearly makes the process more adver-
sarial.245 Nonetheless, even under relaxed rules, these systems apply fair
play rules that include the right to cross-examination, rules against ex
parte statements, and rules preserving evidence on the record.246 In fed-
eral workers’ compensation cases, under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, injured defense contractors working on
overseas military installations have the right to discovery, subpoena wit-
nesses, depose, compel interrogatories, and cross-examine witnesses.247
There is no reason why disabled veterans should not be afforded the
same hearing rights as disabled people in other forums. Proponents of the
current VA system fear that the adoption of APA hearing procedures
would result in veterans losing veteran-friendly rules such as the “as
likely as not” standard, VA’s duty to assist, and the right to file claims at
virtually any time.248 But, as discussed above, APA rules are congruent
with veteran-friendly doctrines and do not present a conflict. There is no
reason why APA hearing procedures used in civil administrative systems
could not be incorporated into the VA system. In fact, it is counter-intui-
tive that a non-adversarial system for veterans affords fewer procedural
rights to claimants than similar civilian systems.
ing procedures. Nonetheless, the legislative history is often cited as the basis for rejecting
proposals to expand hearing rights for veterans. Interestingly, the same legislative history
contemplates Congress’s intent for claimants to have the right to submit interrogatories.
However, that right did not appear in the final version of the Act. See id. at 31,476.
242. See Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124, 129–31 (2014).
243. See id.
244. See M21-1 MANUAL, § D, supra note 201.
245. See 3 LEX K. LARSON & THOMAS A. ROBINSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSA-
TION LAW, DESK EDITION § 127.11(3)(b) (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2018).
246. See id. § 127.11(3)(a); see also 39 JON. L. GELMAN, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
LAW § 26.15 (Thompson West, 3d ed. 2018); MD. CODE REGS. § 14.09.03.09 (2018). It is
common for injured workers in state systems to have the right to subpoena and cross-
examine medical experts.
247. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.458 (2018) (injured coal miners have the right to take deposi-
tions and interrogatories of medical experts); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.601–.615 (2018).
Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, defense contractors have
the right to a hearing before the Office of the Administrative Law Judges (OALJ). The
APA governs OALJ hearings and provides claimants with rights to discovery, to subpoena
and depose witnesses, to compel interrogatories, and to cross-examine witnesses.
248. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 59, at 85.
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B. THE ADOPTION OF APA HEARING PROCEDURES
FOR VA MEDICAL EXAMS
The adoption of APA hearing provisions to aid adjudicators in the de-
velopment of medical opinions could provide tremendous relief to the
process. James Ridgway has observed that, “Much time and effort is
wasted in veterans benefits cases by dividing up the evidence-gathering
and adjudication processes and creating excessive separation between ad-
judicators and physicians.”249 Indeed, the bifurcation of the roles of treat-
ing providers and medical examiners has created significant problems for
the VA.250 Ridgway suggests two reforms that would improve the process
of developing expert testimony without upsetting the non-adversarial
process: (1) adopting APA hearing procedures that would facilitate com-
munication between adjudicators and physicians; and (2) better use of
VA technology.251
Ridgway argues that APA hearing procedures would improve the qual-
ity of medical opinions, resulting in fewer errant opinions.252 The APA
provides basic procedural rights for Social Security disability claimants
that veterans do not have. For example, Social Security claimants have
the right to an attorney at any stage of the claims process,253 and the right
to cross-examination, subpoena witnesses, and compel interrogatories
during hearings.254 Claimants have unfettered access to medical treat-
ment records and expert opinions, and can therefore make informed deci-
sions about their cases.255
Importantly, APA procedures could be implemented without upsetting
the non-adversarial process.256 Like the veterans system, the Social Se-
curity system is considered non-adversarial; that is, there is no attorney
for the SSA who argues against the claim. As Ridgway suggests, VA adju-
dicators could conduct inquisitorial interviews with medical examiners,
similar to the way hearings are conducted in the Social Security disability
benefits system.257 In Social Security hearings, the medical expert is pre-
sent and answers questions from the ALJ and the claimant about his or
her qualifications and opinion.258
249. Ridgway, supra note 104, at 422–23.
250. See id. at 422.
251. See id. at 418.
252. See id. at 423–28.
253. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1700–.1720 (2018). VA claimants are generally limited to legal
representation until they file an appeal.
254. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). These tools are helpful to adjudicators who must
determine the weight of expert medical testimony.
255. See James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Pro-
cess Is Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 239 (2001). Nota-
bly, the provisions of the APA also provide for exhaustion of remedies, ripeness for judicial
review, and deference to agency expertise. This author does not advocate adopting those
provisions, as they would conflict with many of the doctrines in the VA system. See id. at
235–37.
256. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 423.
257. See id.
258. See MEDICAL EXPERT HANDBOOK, supra note 232, at 5–6.
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These interviews would have obvious and immediate effects on the VA
system. Foremost, adjudicators could pose questions about the case, in-
cluding questions raised by the claimants, directly to the medical examin-
ers. This single change would reduce the number of claims that are
remanded for errors and shorten the time that veterans must wait for
decisions.259 Furthermore, interviews would reduce the need for addi-
tional exams to address issues not raised during initial exams. This would
eliminate an adjudicator’s arduous task of weighing multiple and often
conflicting medical opinions.260 Interviews would also encourage examin-
ers to elaborate on their opinions, which would further aid in the devel-
opment of adequate opinions. Most importantly, interviews would give
veterans more assurance that adjudicators are considering all the relevant
medical evidence in their cases and not simply relying on opinions that
support their conclusions.261
One drawback of the proposal is the time that it would add to the pro-
duction of medical opinions. The number of medical exams that the VA
conducts for benefits purposes has grown significantly in the last few
years. Between 2012 and 2013, the VA’s production of medical opinions
increased from 1.79 million to 2.17 million opinions, a 20% increase.262
By 2017, the VA’s production had increased to over 3.6 million opin-
ions.263 The increase is largely due to the overall increase in the number
of veterans receiving disability compensation. From 2000 to 2013, recipi-
ents of disability compensation rose by almost 55%.264 Given this growth,
the administrative burden of conducting interviews is a concern.
However, the adoption of medical interviews arguably would result in a
net decrease in the number of exams. As discussed above, opinions would
be more thoroughly supported and developed, and examiners would have
a better understanding of opinion criteria, thereby reducing the need for
re-exams. Examiners would have more direction and input from adjudi-
cators and claimants, and could therefore more quickly identify and focus
on relevant issues. And not every case would require an interview, as the
process would be reserved for more complex cases. In short, medical in-
terviews would produce better medical opinions, thereby reducing the
notoriously circulative process of evidence development.
259. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 417–18.
260. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 305 (2008) (the Board’s assign-
ment of more probative weight to the VA examiners’ opinions than to the private exam-
iner’s opinion was appropriate where the private examiner overlooked key documents in
the claims file).
261. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 427. Ridgway suggests recording the interviews
not only to create a record, but also to bring transparency to the process.
262. RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 422.
263. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NAT’L CEMETERY ADMIN., BENEFITS AND
BURIAL PROGRAMS AND DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION 187 (2019), https://www.va
.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2019VAbudgetvolumeIIIbenefitsBurialProgramsAndDept
mentalAdministration.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5Z3-UVK6].
264. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., VETERANS’ DISABILITY COMPENSATION: TRENDS AND
POLICY OPTIONS 1 (Aug. 2014) http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
45615-VADisability_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8SC-PPDE].
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As Ridgway points out, the VA already owns technology that could be
used to conduct interviews between geographically separated examiners
and adjudicators. The VA currently uses videoconferencing technology to
hold Board hearings for veterans in Regional Offices across the coun-
try.265 Transcripts from hearings are uploaded to the veterans’ claims
files, making them easily available to the veterans.266 The VA could lever-
age its technology to conduct hearings between medical examiners and
Regional Office adjudicators.267 Because the technology is already used
in a similar fashion at Board hearings, the cost to implement such proce-
dures would be minimal.
Without question, the VA must reform its process for developing medi-
cal expert testimony. Medical interviews, like those used in Social Secur-
ity disability proceedings, offer significant advantages to the VA.
Importantly, the VA has videoconferencing technology that could be
used to conduct medical interviews for geographically separated partici-
pants. Pursuant to its administrative rulemaking authority, the VA could
implement the process with minimal administrative costs.268
C. OTHER PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING INEFFICIENCY
IN THE VA SYSTEM
Some scholars have suggested that appellate review by the Veterans
Court is the root cause of inefficiency and delay in the VA system.269
They argue that Article III courts should hear veterans’ cases rather than
a specialized Article I court with limited powers. Other scholars argue
that the Veterans Court is the proper forum to review VA decisions but
that the Veterans Court should exercise its authority more broadly. This
section examines scholars’ proposals for court reform and considers the
likelihood that such proposals can resolve inefficiencies and delays in the
system.270
The most radical proposals argue that veterans’ benefits cases should
be heard in U.S. district courts rather than the Veterans Court. James T.
O’Reilly proposes combining VA and Social Security claims into a single
disability benefits system.271 Under his proposal, VA Regional Offices
would adjudicate veterans’ claims, but appeals would go to Social Secur-
265. See Ridgway, supra note 122, at 54.
266. See Ridgway, supra note 104, at 426.
267. See id.
268. See 38 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
269. See Wishnie, supra note 37, at 1737–38. Both the VA and the SSA have a four-
tiered system of appellate review, including two agency-level reviews and two levels of
appellate court reviews, that scholars argue is unnecessary and burdensome for veterans.
270. In 2017, Congress passed the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization
Act to address delays in the appellate process. The Act went into effect in February 2019.
The Act created various appeal lanes to help the VA prioritize its claims, though it did not
address any of the procedural issues raised in this article. Therefore, a review of the Act is
not within the scope of this article. See Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered section of
38 U.S.C.).
271. O’Reilly, supra note 255, at 243.
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ity ALJs, then to the Social Security Appeals Council, and then to U.S.
district court.272 The model is attractive because, as discussed above, it
affords claimants the procedural safeguards provided by the APA.273
O’Reilly argues that APA norms would bring veterans’ law jurisprudence
into line with federal administrative law, which would foster accuracy,
efficiency, and accountability in the VA system.274
In a similar proposal, Michael Wishnie argues that the VA should
adopt the immigration model of appeals.275 Claimants in the immigration
system may appeal an adverse decision by the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (the highest administrative level of review in the U.S. immigration
system) directly to the federal courts of appeals. By circumventing district
courts and specialized courts of review, the system avoids the redundant
layers of judicial review in the VA and SSA systems.276 Judicial review by
Article III courts would also eliminate the problem of isolating veterans
from broader developments in administrative and constitutional law.277
Moreover, it would reduce the backlog of claims caused by the recircula-
tion of claims between the Veterans Court and the Board.278
Other scholars argue that delays in the system could be remedied if the
Veterans Court simply exercised broader fact-finding and decision-mak-
ing authority. Judge Michael Allen argues that the Veterans Court could
reduce the number of remands by taking a narrower view of the statutory
prohibition on the Veterans Court’s fact-finding authority.279 Doing so
would allow the Veterans Court to reverse more Board decisions and or-
der the award of benefits.280 He also recommends that the Veterans
Court reexamine how the criteria in Frankel v. Derwinski are being ap-
plied in determining whether cases are referred to three-judge panels for
precedential opinions.281 Such changes would provide more predictability
and continuity in the system and reduce the number of cases on appeal
arising from the increasing backlog of cases at the VA. Finally, Judge Al-
len suggests that the Veterans Court should consider the context in which
it decides cases and issue opinions that provide practical rules and clear
guidance to the pro se claimants that make up the majority of the courts’
appellants.282
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Of course, there are legal and political considerations associated with
O’Reilly’s and Wishnie’s proposals to dramatically alter the appellate
court landscape. First, swapping out the Veterans Court and Federal Cir-
cuit for district and circuit courts would require an act of Congress. The
legal and political maneuvering that would be required to achieve such a
feat is beyond the scope of this article.283 However, even if this herculean
task were possible, it would not change the status quo. Plaintiffs have
challenged the VA’s statutory scheme in U.S. district courts, and the
courts have predictably ruled in favor of the VA. In Veterans for Com-
mon Sense v. Shinseki, two non-profit organizations brought suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the
delays in the VA benefits system experienced by veterans with mental
health disabilities.284 Among other things, the organizations argued for
an accelerated appeals process for mental health claims.285 The court dis-
missed the issues involving benefits decisions on the grounds that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear those issues.286 On the due process challenge,
the court held that the Due Process Clause does not demand a more ex-
pedient system for veterans with mental illness.287 Reviewing the Ma-
thews factors, the court concluded that “Congress purposely designed a
non-adversarial system . . . [that] should be kept as informal and non-
adversarial as possible.”288
Article III courts are generally bound by the same legal doctrines as
the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit and will defer to Congress’s inter-
ests under the Mathews factors in much the same manner. It is true that
Article III courts have a broader stream of cases that expose their judges
to related fields such as employment, public benefits, and disability
law.289 But the problem remains that the courts’ deference to Congress
insulates the non-adversarial system from judicial influence.
The most direct means of balancing the non-adversarial system with
procedural rights to protect veterans’ interests is through VA rulemaking.
The VA has the authority and the technology to supplement the process
for developing expert testimony with APA hearing procedures. The goal
of the non-adversarial system is well meaning. Making the system func-
283. See RIDGWAY, supra note 24, at 22–23. The trio of the U.S. House Veterans Affairs
Committee, the VSOs, and the VA share such close ties that they are collectively known as
the “Iron Triangle.”
284. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1015–16 (9th Cir.
2012).
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ized to review decisions by the VA Secretary affecting the provision of benefits. However,
facial challenges to statutory schemes unrelated to individual benefits may be brought in
general federal courts. For example, a challenge to the absence of system-wide procedures
that are necessary to afford due process could be brought in U.S. district court. Proposals
to drastically alter the appellate court structure would require Congress to revise the juris-
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tional, however, depends on whether the VA is willing to embrace mod-
ern procedural norms.
V. CONCLUSION
Today’s disabled veterans face a crisis. They are plagued by systemic
problems in the VA benefits system that they have no way of addressing.
Endless delays caused by a convoluted process for developing medical
evidence are at the root of the problem. Paradoxically, Congress’s vet-
eran-friendly scheme for distributing benefits is preventing veterans from
addressing these issues. The courts providing judicial review are generally
powerless to resolve these issues. As a result, veterans sit in limbo waiting
for resolution of their cases by an agency searching for leadership and
direction.
Scholars have offered a range of proposals to address these problems.
Conservative proposals contemplate a more expansive role for judges re-
viewing veterans’ claims,290 while radical proposals call for a complete
overhaul of the system.291 Both types of proposals are dependent upon
the will of Congress. However, through administrative rulemaking, the
VA could address the problematic issue of inadequate medical examina-
tions. By adopting APA procedures in the development of medical opin-
ions, the VA could improve communication between adjudicators and
medical examiners and reduce the risk of inadequate medical opinions
that extend the adjudicative process.
The veteran-friendly provisions of the veterans’ benefits systems reflect
the unique relationship this nation has with its defenders. At a minimum,
the VA system should adopt the rights and privileges afforded to disabled
civilians seeking benefits. The nation owes more than a debt of gratitude
to its warriors. Congress and the VA must be vigilant in protecting veter-
ans’ interests, especially when the courts have limited power to do so.
290. See Allen, supra note 134, at 163.
291. See O’Reilly, supra note 255, at 249–54.
